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NPDES Permit System
EPA's Failure to Administer the NPDES Permit System Leads
to a Judicial Mugging
Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc.'
by Daniel C. Mizell
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its passage in 1972, the
Clean Water Act has been used as an
effective tool in cleaning our nation's
waterways. Permits issued under the
Clean Water Act's National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System have been
recognized as the "most successful
pollution abatement effort in the
country...if not the world."' One must
wonder how much more powerful the
pollution abatement effort could become
if the 1972 legislation were fully
implemented. It is a shocking revelation
to find that the Environmental Protection
Agency is still struggling to implement
the necessary permits. The confusion
and complication that arises from this
administrative failure is demonstrated by
Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar
Point Oil Co., Inc.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in
Cedar Point Oil is significant for several
reasons. First, the court ultimately finds
that the definition of pollutant under the
Clean Water Act is expansive enough to
include produced water.' Second, the
court finds that an environmental
organization can allege that its members
were injured in fact based on the
discharge of a pollutant into common
waters. Lastly and most importantly, the
court holds that discharging without an
NPDES permit is a violation of the Clean
Water Act and subject to a citizen suit
even if a pending permit application has
not been acted upon by the
Environmental Protection Agency.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
From August, 1971 to July, 1989,
Chevron Corporation created "produced
water" which originated from oil and gas
drilling activities in Cedar Point Field.'
Cedar Point Field is located in Galveston
Bay, Chambers County, Texas.' Chevron
Corporation discharged its produced
water from an on-shore separating facility
directly into Galveston Bay.' The Texas
Railroad Commission issued a
Commission Permit9 to Chevron
Corporation which allowed discharge of
produced water in this manner." This
Texas Railroad Commission permit limited
only the oil and grease content of
Chevron's produced water."
On July 1, 1989, John
McGowan, the principal shareholder of
Cedar Point Oil Company, purchased
Cedar Point Field from Chevron
Corporation." After the purchase, the
Texas Railroad Commission transferred
Chevron's Commission Permit to John
McGowan." The Commission Permit
allowed McGowan to discharge
produced water, limiting only the oil and
grease content of the discharge. 4 The
Texas Railroad Commission informed
John McGowan that a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit from EPA may be required to
discharge produced water into Galveston
Bay.5
On January 1, 1991 Cedar Point
acquired Cedar Point Field from John
McGowan at no cost.'" Later in 1991,
Cedar Point drilled its first well" in Cedar
Point Field.'" Cedar Point began
producing oil and gas from this newly
drilled well on September 10, 1991.19
Cedar Point, like Chevron
Corporation had done for the past fifteen
'73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, I17 S. Ct. 57 (1996).
2Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related Programs, CA 37 ALI-ABA 295 (1996).
-Cedar Point Oil, 73 F.3d at 562-69.
Id. at 555-59.
sid. at 558-63.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has defined produced water as: "water and particulate matter associated with oil and gas
producing formations. Produced water includes small volumes of source water and treatment chemicals that retum to the surface with the
produced formation fluids and pass through the produced water treating systems currently used by many oil and gas operators." Id. at 550
n.J (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 60,926,60,951 (1992)).
7Id. at 550.
8Id.
9To avoid confusion between permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Texas Railroad Commission, the Texas
Railroad Commission permits for the discharge of produced water are called Commission Permits in this note. For a more complete
discussion of the different types of permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to produced water,see infra notes 75-
97 and accompanying text.





Id. Chevron Corporation's records reflected that Chevron Corporation never acquired a NPDES Permit of any kind to discharge
produced water into Galveston Bay. Id. at 552.
'Id. at 550 n.4.





years, began discharging produced water
into Galveston Bay."' Cedar Point
prepared its produced water for
discharge into Galveston Bay in the
following manner
(1) the oil, gas, and water
mixture...was piped toa platform
in Galveston Bay for the first
phase of separation; (2) after the
initial separation, the remaining
mixture was then piped to shore
where more oil was separated
in a series of tanks; (3) the
produced water then was
transferred to settling pits so
that some constituents could
settle out of the water; and (4)
the remaining produced water
was drained out of the pits and
discharged through a pipe over
the bulkhead into Galveston
Bay.21
Cedar Point discharged
produced water in this manner from
September 1991 through May 1994,
stopping only for a brief period between
April and August, 1992.22 From
September 1991 through May 1994 Cedar
Point discharged between 21,000 and
50,400 gallons of produced water into
Galveston Bay every day."
In 1991, David Russell, Cedar
Point's Vice President, commenced
negotiations with the Texas Railroad
Commission to transfer John McGowan's
Commission Permit to Cedar Point." In
September, 1992 John McGowan's
Commission Permit was transferred to
Cedar Point.25 Because the Texas
Railroad Commission advised Cedar
Point that EPA was considering
prohibiting produced water discharges,
Cedar Point applied to EPA for an NPDES
Permit on October 15, 1992.6
Although EPA acknowledged
on November 5, 1992 that Cedar Point's
application for an NPDES Individual
Permit was administratively complete,
EPA failed to issue a permit or further act
in any way on Cedar Point's application."
Prompted by EPA's inaction, Cedar Point
filed a request to EPA under the Freedom
of Information Act.2" The request asked
EPA if it had ever issued a permit for the
discharge of produced water in Texas.?
On December 16, 1992, the
Sierra Club," Lone Star Chapter (Sierra
Club), informed Cedar Point that
discharging produced water without an
NPDES permit violated the Clean Water
Act.' Sierra Club also informed32 Cedar
Point of its plans to seek a court order
enjoining Cedar Point's produced water
discharges and for monetary damages."
On February 4, 1993 EPA
responded to the Freedom of Information
Act request submitted by Cedar Point
regarding whether any NPDES permit had
been issued in Texas." EPA said it had
issued two general permits, neither of
which applied to Cedar Point because
Cedar Point is in the "Coastal
Subcategory."" Therefore, none of
Cedar Point's produced water discharges
were authorized by an NPDES permit."
On April 23, 1993, Sierra Club
filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Southern District
of Texas. The complaint prayed for:
(1) a judgment declaring that
Cedar Point's unpermitted
discharges of produced water
into Galveston Bay violated the




water]; and (3) penalties for
past unpermitted discharges [of
produced water] '
On August 18, 1993 Cedar Point
2"id. at 551.2
'd.
21d. It is unknown why Cedar Point briefly stopped discharging produced water.
231d. Cedar Point's produced water contained barium, benzene, zinc, chlorides, sulfate, bicarbonate, ammonia, naphthalene, phenolic,





"5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
"Cedar Point Oil, 73 F.3d at 552.
"'The Sierra Club is a nationwide organization of environmentally concerned citizens.
"Id. at 553.
'ld. at 553 n.15 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(1994)). Sierra Club sent a letter to Cedar Point to comply with the Clean Water Act's citizen
suit provision. "The CWA requires that a person bringing an action under the citizen suit provision send an 'intent to sue' letter to the
EPA, the alleged violator, and the state in which the alleged violation occurs at least 60days prior to the commencement of the action."Id.
at 553.
"Id. at 553. Cedar Point promptly responded by filing a petition in the United States District Court for the Southem District of
Mississippi requesting an order which: (1) required EPA to respond to Cedar Point's then-unanswered Freedom of Information Act
request; (2) required EPA to rule upon Cedar Point's application for an NPDES Permit; and (3) enjoined Sierra Club from filing a citizen
suit against Cedar Point. The district court dismissed all claims against Sierra Club on July 12, 1993. Id. at 553.
I4ld. at 552.
"Id. See infra, notes 75 to 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of permit types and Environmental Protection Agency categories.
'6Cedar Point Oil, 73 F.3d at 553.
"Id. At this time, the District Court also entered an order for accelerated discovery. This order required disclosure of the expert testimony
that each party would offer at trial. Id. at 553.
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filed its answer and a counterclaim
against Sierra Club."' The counterclaim
sought compensatory damages for the
emotional distress of Cedar Point's
officers and $10,000,000 in punitive
damages based on the notion that Sierra
Club's citizen suits against Cedar Point
and other oil and gas operators was an
abuse of process." The District Court
granted Sierra Club's motion to dismiss
Cedar Point's counterclaim finding that
Sierra Club's citizen suit was not frivolous
and therefore could not constitute the
basis for an abuse of process action."
After hearing motions for
summary judgment by both Sierra Club
and Cedar Point, the District Court
entered an order finding that, as a matter
of law, Cedar Point had discharged
pollutants without an NPDES permit in
violation of the Clean Water Act." The
District Court also found that the
affidavits submitted by Sierra Club
established standing for the Lone Star
Chapter to sue on behalf of its members,
and therefore were sufficient to defeat
Cedar Point's motion for summary
judgment.42
The only issues tried before the
District Court were the penalties to be
assessed against Cedar Point for its past
violations and Sierra Club's request for
injunctive relief.4 3 On May 24, 1994 the
District Court ordered Cedar Point to pay
a civil penalty of $186,070.44 This
represented the money Cedar Point
saved by not constructing a system that
would eliminate all contaminants before
discharge of the produced water." The
District Court also enjoined Cedar Point
from discharging any more produced
water into Galveston Bay until it received
an NPDES Permit of some kind.'
I Cedar Point appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit. Cedar Point alleged: (1) Sierra
Club lacked standing to sue; (2) Sierra
Club failed to state a claim under the Clean
Water Act; (3) Cedar Point did not violate
the Clean Water Act by discharging
produced water into Galveston Bay; (4)
the District Court erred in calculating the
amount of the penalty imposed and
attorneys' fees awarded; and (5) the
District Court erred in dismissing Cedar
Point's counterclaim for
abuse of process.47
On January 9, 1995, EPA
promulgated an NPDES General Permit
which addressed the discharge of
produced water by individuals or entities
in the "Coastal Subcategory."' The
NPDES General Permit imposed an
absolute prohibition on the discharge
of produced water.49 This NPDES
General Permit became effective on
February 8, 1995. EPA also issued an
administrative compliance order
allowing5" the gradual phase out of
produced water discharge until January
1, 1997?
On January 30,1995 Cedar Point
filed a motion to amend the District
Court's final order.52 Cedar Point
requested permission to
discharge produced water on February
8, 1995 and thereafter so that it could take
advantage of the two year phase out
period." The District Court granted this
motion and amended its May 27, 1994
order.5 4 Sierra Club appealed the
amendment of order to the United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.5
On January 11, 1996 the United
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, filed
its opinion affirming the actions of the
District Court. The Fifth Circuit held that
(1) Sierra Club had standing to sue based
on the individual standing of its





42d. Also in the pretrial stage, the District Court struck Cedar Point's designation of experts that it would offer at trial because Cedar Point
failed to comply with the District Court's discovery order. The reports submitted by Cedar Point were substantively inadequate and




Id. The last portion of the District Court's order awarded Sierra Club $82,956.86 in attomey's fees because they were the prevailing
party in the litigation. Id. at 554.
"Id. at 555. Cedar Point also appealed the District Court's striking of Cedar Point's designation of experts. Id. at 555.
Id. at 554. See infra, notes 75 to 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of permit types and Environmental Protection Agency
categones.
'Cedar Point Oil, 73 F.3d at 554.
-"Id. The administrative compliance order only applied to operators who would be discharging produced water on the effective date of the
NPDES general permit. For example, if an operator was not discharging produced water on February 8, 1995 then they could not take








under the citizen suit provision of the
Clean Water Act; (3) Cedar Point violated
§ 1311(a) of the Clean Water Act; (4) the
District Court properly assessed the
economic penalties and attorneys' fees;
(5) the District Court properly dismissed
Cedar Point's counterclaim because
Cedar Point failed to state a claim for
abuse of process against Sierra Club; and
(6) the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it modified its injunction
and allowed Cedar Point to discharge
produced water under EPA's
administrative compliance order."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Structure and Judicial
Interpretation
The predecessor to the modem
day Clean Water Act was enacted in
I948.11 The 1948 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act only allowed a court to grant
relief from pollution if the court found
that abatement was both practicable and
economically feasible."
Congress passed a complete
revision and recodification of the 1948
Federal Water Pollution Control Act in
1972.1 The 1972 revision is what we now
know as the Clean Water Act.6 It
provided for water quality standards and
periodic modification of those
standards.6' Most importantly, the 1972
amendments established the NPDES
permit program to regulate the discharge
of pollutants into our nation's
waterways.62
An NPDES permit is required
whenever a pollutant is discharged.6 1
While the statutory definition of
pollutant is helpful, it does not address
every type of substance that could be
released into our nation's waterways.
Therefore, courts have had to interpret
what substances fall into the category
of "pollutants." Generally courts have
interpreted the term very broadly.'
For instance, in National
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,'6 one of
the main issues on appeal before the
Court of Appeals was what constituted
a pollutant under the Clean Water Act.'
In Gorsuch, several public utilities
operated electric producing dams. Those
dams made the water that flowed from
the dams low in dissolved oxygen, high
in dissolved minerals and nutrients, too
low of a temperature, or supersaturated
with oxygen .6 In that litigation, the
National Wildlife Federation and the
State of Missouri argued that these
changes in water quality constituted a
pollutant under the Clean Water Act, and
EPA failed to regulate these discharges.'
EPA argued that dams only induced
insignificant water quality changes, and
therefore were not a widespread or
serious problem.' The Court of Appeals
held that EPA's definition of pollutant
was reasonable and not inconsistent
with Congressional intent. Therefore,
due to the great deference accorded to
EPA, EPA's decision was upheld."'
The Clean Water Act
statutorily defines "discharge of a
pollutant" as "(A) any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source, (B) any addition of any
pollutant to the waters of the contiguous
zone or the ocean from any point source
other than a vessel or other floating
56The Court of Appeals also held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in striking Cedar Point's experts and excluding the
expert's testimony because Cedar Point violated the discovery order. Id. at 550.
"Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). For a more complete history of the Clean Water Act, see C. Peter Goplerud, III, Water
Pollution Law: Milestones From the Past and Anticipation of the Future, 10 NAT. RESOURCEs & ENV'T 7 (1995).
58Id.
sPub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
'Congress enacted corrections to the Act in 1977, and amendments to the Act in 1987. However, the core provisions of the Clean Water
Act were established in the 1972 recodification.
6133 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).
6233 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
6
"Pollutant" is defined to include industrial, municipal, or agricultural wastes; chemical wastes;biological materials; garbage; sewage;
sewage sludge; solid wastes; heat; dredge spoil; incinerator residue; rock; sand; cellar dirt; wrecked or discarded equipment; radioactive
materials; filter backwash; and munitions. A pollutant is not: (A) sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the normal operation
of a vessel of the Armed Forces... or (B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas; or
water derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if... approved by authority of the State in which the well
is located, and if such State determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water resources.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1996).
"Forexample, the United States Supreme Court has held that unexploded bombs which were dropped into the ocean during military target
practice could be a pollutant under the Clean Water Act. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). For more judicial
interpretations, see: Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F.Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),aff'd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.
1991); National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F.Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'don other grounds, 862 F.2d 580
(6th Cir. 1988).








craft."" The definition of the term "point
source", which is central to the definition
of discharge of a pollutant, has generated
more controversy and litigation than any
of the terms affecting the scope and
applicability of the NPDES permit
system. 2 The Clean Water Act defines
point source as any:
discernable, confined, and
discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to any pipe,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated
animal feeding operation, or
vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or
may be discharged."
Like the term pollutant, point source has
also been interpreted broadly by
courts."
B. The NPDES Permit System
While it is true that the Clean
Water Act prohibits the discharge of
pollutants from point sources into
navigable waters, the NPDES permit
system was established to allow for
exceptions and limitations. The
unauthorized discharge of pollutants is
a violation of the Clean Water Act unless
the individual or entity discharging the
pollutant has submitted a complete
application' for an NPDES permit at least
180 days prior to commencing the
discharge." Although EPA has the
primary authority to issue and enforce
NPDES permits,n both EPA and the
states have a role in the administration
of the NPDES permit system.
Authorization to discharge pollutants
may be obtained either at the state level
or the federal level, depending on what
type of system the particular state has
adopted." States that have EPA
approved NPDES permit programs are
called "delegated" states and states
without EPA approved NPDES permit
programs are called "non-delegated"
states."
To issue its own NPDES
permits and therefore become a
"delegated" state, a state must satisfy
five requirements. First a state must
submit to EPA a description of the state's
proposed NPDES program.' Second, a
state must submit to EPA a declaration
from the state attorney general stating
that the laws of the state have adequate
authority to carry out the proposed
NPDES permit program."' Third, the state
must enter into a "Memorandum of
Agreement" with the applicable EPA
Regional Office which sets forth the
relative responsibilities of the state
agency and the EPA Regional Office."'
Fourth, the state must adopt a compliance
evaluation program which includes the
procedures for inspection and
surveillance of facilities." Lastly, the
state must adopt a lengthy set of
enforcement regulations." The sum of
this procedure is attestation by the state
that any permits issued under the
delegated program comply with the Clean
Water Act,
Nondelegated states are less
common than delegated states." In
nondelegated states, NPDES permits are
issued by EPA regional offices if the state
"certifies" the permit or waives its right
to do so." Certification by the
nondelegated state is an attestation that
the permit contains conditions sufficient
to assure compliance with any applicable
state water standards, and the Clean
Water Act."
The appropriate state or federal
authority can issue either general or
individual NPDES permits. A general
permit covers discharges by similar
facilities that are located in different
places.' The delegated state agency or
733 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994).
72Karen M. Wardzinski, et al., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application and Issuance Procedures, in THE
CLEAN WATER AcT HANDBOOK, 10 (Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994).
733 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994).
'See generally Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991); Fishel v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 640 F.Supp. 442 (M.D.
Pa. 1986); Carr v. Alta Verde Indust., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 199 1); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Weisman, 489 F.Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
"Karen M. Wardzinski, et al., supra note 72, at 66-69.
7 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(c) (1996).
7733 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
"Oklahoma v. United States Envil. Prot. Agency, 908 E2d 595, 597-98 (10th Cir. 1990).
7'United States v. Avatar Holdings, Inc., No. 93-281-CIV-FTM-21, 1996 WL 479533 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 1996).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 123.22 (1996).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 123.25 (1996); Adequate authority means that the state has adopted provisions at least as
stringent as the federal NPDES regulations.
8240 C.F.R. § 123.24 (1996). See also Champion Intemational Corp. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir.
1988).
$340 C.F.R. § 123.26 (1996).
-40 C.F.R. § 123.27 (1996) sets out the remedies and enforcement mechanism that the state must adopt. For comparability issues
between enforcement mechanisms at the federal and state levels,see Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 3d 376,382
(8th Cir. 1994).
"Richard S. Davis & Shelley V. Lucas, Water Pollution, in 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRAcTICE GUIDE, § 18.03(1)(a) (Michael B. Gerrard ed.,
1991): "As of the date of this writing in late 1991, 40 states had approved NPDES programs."
-33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 124.53 (1996).
"33 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1311, 1316, 1317 (1994); If the nondelegated state does not certify the NPDES permit within 60 days, certification
is waived pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1341(s)(1) (1994) (as interpreted in 40 C.F.R. § 124.53(c)(3) (1996)).
"Timothy F. Malloy, Once More Unto the Breach, 7 VIuL. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 47 (1996).
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EPA itself usually initiates the creation
of an NPDES general perrnit. 9 General
permits may be appropriate for any
category of sources within a defined
geographic area that: involve similar
operations; discharge the same types of
wastes; require the same effluent
limitation, operating conditions, or
standards for sewage sludge use or
disposal; require the same or similar
monitoring; and are more appropriately
controlled under a general permit rather
than an individual permit." The use of
general permits was first suggested to
EPA over twenty years ago" and has
become the principal administrative
mechanism by which large numbers of
similarly situated producers are
regulated. 92
In contrast to general permits,
NPDES individual permits are issued to
one producer. The application for an
individual permit is usually initiated by
the producer of the potential pollutant.9 3
Individual permits are issued on a case
by case basis.94 A delegated state or
EPA may require any discharger which
is covered by a general permit to obtain
an individual permit." This decision is
predicated upon whether the
circumstances of the discharge have
changed enough to require the
termination of the general permit."
When the appropriate state or
federal agency issues an NPDES permit
of either type, it contains effluent
limitations. An effluent limitation, as
defined in the Clean Water Act, is any
restriction on quantities, rates, and
concentrations of chemical, physical,
biological, and other constituents which
are discharged from a point source into
navigable waters. 7
C. Citizen Suits and the Requirement of
Standing
The Clean Water Act, like many
federal environmental statutes, may be
enforced through citizen suits. Two
types of citizen suits are contemplated
by the Clean Water Act. First, a citizen is
authorized to bring a civil suit against
any person, entity, or governmental
instrumentality who is alleged to be in
violation of an effluent limitation or an
order issued by EPA.9 ' Second, a citizen
is authorized to bring a civil suit against
EPA itself if EPA has failed to perform an
act that is not discretionary."9 Any
citizen suit must be brought in the United
States District Court where the discharge
source is located."
The holding in National
Resource Defense Council. Inc. v.
Castle"" makes it impossible to
challenge NPDES permit decisions made
by EPA via a citizen suit because Costle
held that the decision to issue an NPDES
permit is discretionary." Therefore,
nearly all challenges to NPDES permit
violations come via citizen suits against
persons or entities.
The requirement of standing
has been an obstacle to successful
citizen suits against persons or
entities."" At times, the standing
requirement is accentuated because an
environmental group seeks to bring suit
-40 C.F.R. § 123.25 (1996). See also, Anthony P. Tokarz & Betsy Ennis Dulin, Wetlands Regulations Affecting Coal Mining and Oil and
Gas Operations, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 261, 266 (1995).
'Karen M. Wardzinski, et al., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application and Issuance Procedures, in THE
CLEAN WATER Act HANDBOOK, 27 (Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994).
"The United States District Court for the District of Columbia first suggested the general permit scheme to EPA in Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Train, 396 F.Supp 1393 (D.D.C. 1975).
-40 C.F.R. § 122.28 (1996); Robert L. Glicksman,Pollution on the Federal Lands II: Water Pollution Law, 12 UCLA J. ENvT.. L. & POL'Y
61,69 (1993).
'Karen M. Wardzinski, et al., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application and Issuance Procedures, in THE
CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, 12 (Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994).
941d.
-40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(3)(1996).
9fId.
-33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1994); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1345 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557
(1992); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 n.22 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v. Plaza Health Lab., 3 F3d 643,646 (2d
Cir. 1993); David E. Filippi, Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Environmental Enforcers Beware!, 26 ENVTL. L. 923, 929 (1996); Debra L.
Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, ECOLOGY L. Q. 201, 232 (1996).
"33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
"Id. See generally: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir, 1993); Sierra
Club v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993); Save Our Community v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 971
F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992); Chicago Ass'n of Commerce & Industry v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 873 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1989);
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 870 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989).
m33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) and (c)(1)( 1994).
o'National Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 E2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
021d. at 1375.
"o3Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247 (1996); Lino A. Graglia,
et al., The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and Judicial Mandates, 28 ARIz. ST. L. J., 17, 100 (1996); Kelly
Murphy, Cutting Through the Forest ofthe Standing Doctrine: Challenging Resource Management Plans in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 223, 239-43 (1996).
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on behalf of its members."' Standing is
a constitutional requirement flowing
from the "case or controversy" clause of
the United States Constitution.' In
addition to the constitutional precepts,
there are prudential limitations that may
cause a court to deny standing."'
However, the Clean Water Act aids the
organization seeking standing on the
part of its members by conferring
standing to the limits of the
constitution. '0 Congress granted an
express right of action to persons
otherwise barred by prudential standing
rules.'a
In Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc.,'" the Third
Circuit said that organizational standing
is appropriate where:
(1) the organization's members
would have standing to sue on
their own, (2) the interests the
organization seeks to protect
are germane to its purpose, and
(3) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires
individual participation by it
members."'
To qualify for individual
standing, the only constitutional
prerequisites are that a) the party who
invokes the court's authority show that
he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant; b) that the injury fairly can
be traced to the challenged action; and
c) the injury can be redressed by a
favorable decision."' Redressability is
least likely to be litigated in the
environmental organizational standing
context because an injunction or
monetary damages can usually redress
the plaintiff's injury."' However, the
requirement of an injury that is fairly
traceable to the alleged conduct is often
more difficult to satisfy.' '"
In Lujan v. National Wildltfe
Federation,"4 the National Wildlife
Federation filed suit challenging the land
withdrawal review program of the United
States Bureau of Land Management."
National Wildlife Federation's
organizational standing was predicated
upon affidavits of its members."' The
Supreme Court held that National
Wildlife Federation did not have
standing because it was insufficient that
"one of [National Wildlife Federation's]
members uses unspecified portions of an
immense tract of territory.""' In sum, the
plaintiff's could not establish that the
affiants' injury was fairly traceable to the
defendant's conduct.
The Third Circuit had to
determine if the affiants' injury was fairly
traceable to the discharge of industrial
chemicals in Powell Duffryn."" The
Third Circuit announced: the plaintiff
must show that a defendant had (I)
discharged some pollutant in
concentrations greater than allowed by
its permit (2) into a waterway in which
the plaintiffs have an interest that is or
may be adversely affected by the
pollutant and that (3) the pollutant
causes or contributes to the kinds of
injuries alleged by the plaintiffs."
Lujan and Powell Duffryn
demonstrate how malleable the fairly
traceable test can be. At one end of the
spectrum lies the Lujan standard which
"'Miles A. Yanick, Loss of Protection as Injury In Fact: An Approach to Establishing Standing to Challenge Environmental Planning
Decisions, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 857-58 (1996).
"KU.S. CONsT. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
""Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question
of standing. Thus, this Court has held that 'the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interest, and cannot rest his claim
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). In addition, even when the plaintiff has
alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the Court has refrained from adjudicating 'abstract questions of
wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative
branches. Id. at 499-50. Finally, the Court has required that the plaintiff's complaint fall within 'the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.' Ass'n of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1969)." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982).
"'Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 (3rd Cir. 1990).
"'RId. at 70 n. 3 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)); David Sive, Environmental Standing, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 49,
52(1995).
""Powell Duffrvn, 913 F.2d at 64.
"Id. at 70 (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
"'Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 464 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
"
2Jeffery W. Ring & Andrew F. Behrend, Using Plaintiff Motivation to Limit Standing: An Inappropriate Attempt to Short-Circuit
Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LmriG. 345, 350 (1993).
"'Robert Wiy gul, Gwaltney Eight Years Later: Proving Jurisdiction and Article III Standing in Clean WaterAct Citizen Suits, 8 TuL. ENvrL.
L. J. 435,448 (1995); Matthew M. Werner, Comment, Mootness and Citizen Suit Civil Penalty Claims Under the Clean Water Act: A Post-
Lujan Reassessment, 25 ENVTL. L. 801, 805 (1995); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); O'Hair v.
White, 675 F.2d 680,691 (5th Cir. 1982); Save Our Community v. United States Enytl. Prot. Agency, 971 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1992).
"





7 d. at 888.
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requires a concrete connection or some
formal nexus.'2 0 At the other end of the
spectrum lies the Powell Duffryn
standard which, as applied, only requires
a "mere pertinence between litigation
subject and organizational purpose." 2 '
D. EPA'S History of Administrative
Failure
An administrative default can
be another obstacle to parties attempting
a citizen suit. The Clean Water Act
envisions that effluent limitations will be
formulated by EPA to address every type
of pollution that could be introduced into
our navigable waters."' Persons or
entities emitting pollutants in excess of
the limitations can be held in violation of
the Clean Water Act and subject to its
penalties if they have not obtained an
NPDES permit.' When the effluent
limitations and NPDES permits
envisioned by the Clean Water Act have
not been issued, however, and will not
be issued in the foreseeable future,
courts have had to decide whether citizen
suits can proceed where EPA has not
promulgated an effluent limitation or
issued an NPDES permit that covers the
discharge."'
In United States v. GAF
Corp.,' 3 the United States brought an
action to enjoin GAF Corporation's
drilling of subsurface reinjection wells.'2 6
GAF Corporation had applied for an
NPDES permit, but EPA had not acted
upon the application.'12 The court
decided that the disposal of chemical
wastes into underground waters does
not constitute a discharge of a pollutant
into navigable waters.'" The court then
entered into a discussion of EPA's
administrative inaction.'" The court said
that it would be an "intolerable result" if
GAF Corporation was unable to
discharge any wastes at all simply
because EPA failed to establish the
required effluent limitations." In sum,
GAF said that a discharger can only
violate an effluent limitation if the EPA
has established an effluent limitation. 3'
Like GAF, United States v.
Frezzo Bros., Inc.,'13 dealt with a
situation where EPA never established
required effluent limitations. In Frezzo
Bros., the United States brought an action
against mushroom producers for
discharging storm water run-off that was
laden with hay and horse manure."'
Frezzo Brothers Incorporated did not
believe its discharge constituted a
pollutant, and therefore never applied for
an NPDES permit. 3 4 The court held that
the "promulgation of effluent limitation
standards is not a prerequisite to the
maintenance of a criminal proceeding
based on a violation of section 1311(a)
of the Act."'" The court stated that this
case was "particularly compelling for
broad enforcement" because Frezzo
Brothers Incorporated never applied for
an NPDES permit.'"
Although decided under the
Clean Air Act, General Motors Corp. v.
United States'" also dealt with the
situation where EPA failed to perform
their required administrative functions.
General Motors Corporation (GMC)
operated an automobile painting facility
in Massachusetts.'" Under the Clean
Air Act, Massachusetts filed a state
implementation plan which required GMC
to comply with applicable ozone
discharge limitations by 1985.'" In 1985,
GMC sought an extension of the deadline
until 1987.1" EPA failed to act upon this
request for extension until September 4,
1988.14' However, on August 17, 1987,
EPA filed an enforcement action against
GMC alleging that GMC failed to comply
'"Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21,24 (D.D.C. 1979); Sierra Club v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 585 F.Supp. 842, 845
(N.D.N.Y. 1984).
"'Humane Society v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
2233 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994).
'"33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
124See Carr v. Alta Verde Indust., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1060 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991); Concerned Area Residents for Env't v. Southview Farm,
34 F.3d 114, 117 (2nd Cir. 1994); Menzel v. County Utils. Corp., 712 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1983); Washington Wilderness Coalition v.
Hecla Min. Co., 870 F.Supp. 983, 986 (E.D. Wash. 1994).




1"Id. at 1383. For more discussion on this portion of the GAF decision, see Philip M. Quatrochi, Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the




'"United States v. Frezzo Bros. Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1979).
'"Id. at 1125.
'"Id. at 1128. For a discussion of the collateral issues raised in Frezzo Bros., see Kristen E. Mollnow, Note, Concerned Area Residents
for the Environment v. Southview Farm: Just What is a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation Under the Clean Water Act?, 60 ALa. L.
REV. 239 (1996).
'
" Id. For a more complete discussion of environmental crime, see Steve Curran, et al., Environmental Crimes, 32 AM. CRiM. L. Rev. 245
(1995).
1361d.







with applicable ozone discharge
limitations."' The United States
Supreme Court held that EPA was free to
initiate suit whenever a person is in
violation of any applicable state
implementation plan, regardless of
whether an extension of the deadline is
proposed.'"
that could be assessed against a violator
and reduce that maximum penalty
depending on if the statutory factors are
present.'"
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Standing under the Clean Water Act
The first issue the Fifth Circuit
dealt with was whether Sierra Club had
would redress the injury.' Cedar Point
argued that because the affidavits only
expressed concern that the continued
discharge of produced water would
impair the affiants' use of Galveston Bay,
no injury in fact was stated.' 5 However,
the Fifth Circuit said the basis of the
injury in fact test was whether or not the
affiants had a direct stake in the
E. Sanctions Under the Clean Water Act standing to bring a suit on behalf of its litigation.5 6 Applyingthis test, the Fifth
If a court decides that a citizen members." In a de novo review' of Circuit said the affiants clearly have a
has stated a claim and has proven its case the district court's holding on the direct stake in the outcome of the lawsuit
against a polluter, the Clean Water Act standing issue, the court began by between Sierra Club and Cedar Point
directs the District Court to assess a civil seting out the Powell Duiryn three even if the injury in fact is a threatened
penalty to the polluter.'" Civil penalties prong test that an organization must meet injury.' 5 7
range up to twenty-five thousand dollars to bring a suit on behalf of its members.'' The Fifth Circuit then turned to
($25,000) for each day the violation TheFifthCircuitsaidthatorganizational Cedar Point's assertion that the
continues, but the court must consider standing is appropriate where: (1) the threatened injury is not fairly traceable
these factors in deciding the penalty to organization's members would have to Cedar Point's discharge of produced
be assessed: (1) the seriousness of the standing to sue on their own, (2) the water.' The Fifth Circuit also used the
violation or violations; (2) the economic interests the organization seeks to Powell Duiyn test to determine if the
benefit that may have resulted from the protect are germane to its purpose, and affiants' injury was fairly traceable to
violation; (3) any history of such (3)neithertheclaimassertednortherelief Cedar Point's discharge of produced
violations; (4) any good faith efforts to requested requires individual water.' TheFifth Circuit's interpretation
comply with the applicable requirements; participation by it members.' of the fairly traceable standard did not
(5) the economic impact of the penalty Since Cedar Point did not require proof toa scientific certainty that
on the violator; and (6) such other disputewhetherSierraClubsatisfiedthe Cedar Point's discharge harmed the
matters as justice may require."' second and third prongs of the test, the affiants, it only required contribution to
In Atlantic States Legal FifthCircuitconcentratedonwhetherthe the pollution which impairs the affiant's
Foundation v. Tyson Foods, Inc., * the members could establish individual use of Galveston Bay."' It was enough
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh standing.' Sierra Club submitted that one of the affiants canoed in the
Circuit formulated a framework for affidavits from three of its members to vicinity of Cedar Point's discharge, and
applying the statutory factors."' The demonstrate that there was an injury in Sierra Club's expert said produced water
Eleventh Circuit concluded that a court fact, the injury was fairly traceable to discharges generally have adverse






"'33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(1994).
1"-33 U.S.C. § 13l9(d)(l 994).
'
1 tAtlantic States Legal Foundation v. Tyson Foods, In ., 897 F 2d 1128(11th Cir. 1990).
I "'Id. at 1142.
10Id.
"sCedar Point Oil, 73 F.3d at 555-59.
"S'Id. at 555 (citing MD 1s Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 28 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 1994)).
'
5
'ld. (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,343(1977); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United
States Dep't of Treasury, 25 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir. 1994); Save Our Community v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 971 F.2d
1155, 1160F (thCCii. 1992)).
s
21d. (citing Powell Duffieyn, 913 F.2d at 64).




-'Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 473 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972))).
-'
57 id. (citing Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472).
pocad. at 557.
"9pd. (citing Powell Duffpyn, 913 F.2d at 72).
Sicd. at 558.
6 Id. in footnote 24 of the decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly limited its fairly traceable analysis to these facts: "while we find the Powell
Duffryn test useful for analyzing whether Douglas's (the affiant who canoed near Cedar Point's discharge in Galveston Bay) affidavit meets
the 'fairly traceable' requirement, we recognize that it may not be an appropriate standard in other [Clean Water Act cases.
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B. Stating a Claim Under the Clean
Water Act
The next issue the Fifth Circuit
dealt with was whether the Sierra Club
stated a claim under the Clean Water
Act.' Cedar Point argued that since
EPA only issued a effluent limitation on
the oil and grease content of produced
water, and Cedar Point's discharges have
always complied with this limitation, there
is no violation of the Clean Water Act. 63
The Fifth Circuit found that Cedar Point's
argument was without merit because an
NPDES permit is required for the
discharge of any pollutant."M The Fifth
Circuit held that if no NPDES permit is
obtained, then the discharge is in
violation of the Clean Water Act and
subject to citizen suits."
To support its finding, the Fifth
Circuit examined the legislative history
of the Clean Water Act.'" The Fifth
Circuit explained that when the Clean
Water Act was first enacted in 1972, it
was the drafter's intent that EPA
establish NPDES individual and general
permits for every discharge, anywhere
in the United States.' The drafters
realized that this process may take time,
so they provided a one year window for
citizen's suits to proceed only if an
effluent limitation was established by
EPA.'" This one year window balanced
the need to allow citizen's suits to
proceed if based on a violation of an
effluent limitation while at the same time
giving EPA time to develop the NPDES
permit system.'
The Fifth Circuit said that even
though the drafters of the Clean Water
Act were a bit too ambitious in giving
EPA a one year window to develop the
NPDES permit system, EPA has not
issued all of the required NPDES permits
and the Clean Water Act has never been
revised to account for this fact.7 0 The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress'
subsequent inaction evinces an intent
to hold dischargers liable despite the fact
that EPA failed to act."' Therefore, the
discharger of a pollutant that has not
obtained an NPDES permit from EPA is
in violation of the Clean Water Act, even
if the violation results from EPA's failure
or refusal to issue the necessary
permit. 7 2
The Fifth Circuit held that the
Clean Water Act's sanctions should be
applied against Cedar Point in the same
manner as the United States Supreme
Court applied the sanctions in General
Motors, Corp. v. United States.'7 3 The
Fifth Circuit then advanced three
arguments in favor of the imposition of
liability. First, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, by rejecting the reasoning
of United States v, GAF Corp.7 1 The
Fifth Circuit refused to follow GAF
because GAF would allow dangerous
pollutants to be introduced into
navigable waters solely because of
administrative delay."
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit
recognized that EPA itself stated that
citizens have the right to sue Coastal
Subcategory dischargers of produced
water."' The Fifth Circuit found it
persuasive that at the time EPA
recognized the citizen's ability to sue, EPA
had never issued any NPDES permits
and had only issued effluent limitations
on the oil and grease content of the
produced water.
C. Definition of Pollutant Under the
Clean Water Act
The Fifth Circuit next turned to
Cedar Point's activities and whether
those activities involved the discharge
of a pollutant.I' Cedar Point argued that
the discharge of produced water was not
the discharge of a pollutant and only EPA
has the power to classify produced water
as a pollutant under the Clean Water
Act."' For these propositions, Cedar
Point relied on National Wildlife
Federation, Inc. v. Gorsuch.,"
To determine whether Cedar
Point was discharging a pollutant, the
Fifth Circuit first examined the statutory
definition of pollutant,"' The court noted
that the statutory definition was
confusing because it included very
specific substances like "cellardirt" and
also very general terms like "industrial













"'Id. (citing Costle, 568 F.2d at 1375).
'
7 1d. at 561.
'
7 1d. (citing General Motors Corp., 496 U.S. at 530).
'
7 1d. at 562 (citing Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1123; GAF, 389 F.Supp. at 1379).
'
751d. (citing Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1128).
'




"Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156.





inclusion of these imprecise terms makes
the statutory definition or the legislative
history of little help in deciding what
Congress wanted the term "pollutant" to
include.' 3 The Fifth Circuit then
concludes, by adopting a
commentator's"' position on the
subject, that substances not specifically
included in the statute may still be called
pollutants."'s The court adopted a
definition which includes a "generic
understanding" of the term pollutant,
favoring a broad and inclusive reading
of the statute."'
Next the court decided, as
between EPA and the courts, who has
the power to expand the statutory
definition of pollutant.' 7 The Fifth Circuit
&ummarily rejected Cedar Point's
contention that the court did not have
the power to expand the definition of
pollutant.' The Fifth Circuit said a
citizen may also bring an action against
a person that is discharging an "alleged
pollutant..."" It would make no sense
to allow a citizen suit where the court
has no power to determine if a pollutant
was discharged or not.'" Secondly, the
Fifth Circuit said numerous Clean Water
Act cases have decided whether a
particular substance is a pollutant, so its
holding is supported by precedent from
the Supreme Court and other circuits."'
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit
deterinined if produced water is a
pollutant under the Clean Water Act."'
The court used , both statutory
arguments and EPA guidance to
determine that produced water was
indeed a pollutant.' The court noted
that the Clean Water Act specifically
provides that water derived from oil and
gas production which is reinjected into
the oil well is not a pollutant.194 The Fifth
Circuit believed that this exception
evinced Congress' intent to call
otherwise disposed of produced water a
pollutant."' The Fifth Circuit also said
Cedar Point's produced water should be
classified as a pollutant under the Clean
Water Act because: 1) EPA has
"recognized that citizens have the right
to sue 'Coastal Subcategory' operators
who are discharging produced water
without a permit"; 2) EPA has explicitly
referred to produced water as a pollutant;
and 3) Cedar Point's produced water
contained benzene, naphthalene, and
zinc, which are all listed by EPA as toxic
pollutants.'
The Fifth Circuit did recognize,
in a footnote, that its expansion of the
definition of pollutant could create
difficult cases in the future.'9 The Fifth
Circuit said that there may be a variety of
reasons why an NPDES permit has not
been issued, including administrative
delay and statutory ambiguity.'1"
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit warned courts
considering the question to exercise
restraint and examine the circumstances
carefully before stretching the definition
of pollutant.'"
D. Sanctions Under the Clean Water
Act
The Fifth Circuit next2"0
examined the penalty and attorney's fees
imposed by the lower court against Cedar
Point.20 ' The Fifth Circuit reviewed the
lower court's findings of fact with caution
because the lower court adopted Sierra
Club's proposed findings with little
modification.202 Although the District
Court imposed a penalty based solely on
the money Cedar Point saved by not
disposing of the produced water
properly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
because the District Court considered all
the statutory factors before settling on
this amount.203 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the award of attorney's fees to Sierra
Club because Sierra Club had standing
to sue, Cedar Point was violating the
Clean Water Act, and Sierra Club was
the prevailing party in the action."
E. The Abuse ofProcess Counterclaim
The Fifth Circuit then turned to
"Id. (citing Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 173).
"2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AIR AND WATER §4.10 at 144 (1986).






''Id. at 567 (citing Concerned Area Residents for Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Plaza Health
Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 645 (2nd Cir. 1993); United States v. Schallom, 998 F.2d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 1992); National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1505-06 (1lth Cir.




'"Id. at 568 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B)).
"Id.
1'Id. (citing 57 Fed.Reg. 60,926,60,944-45 (1992); 56 Fed.Reg. 7698 (1991); 46 Fed.Reg. 20,284; 40 C.F.R. § 401.15).
'Id. at 569 n. 37.
"Id.
19Id.




21d. at 574 (citing Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Texarkana Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cit. 1989)).
2'"Id. at 574-76.
21Id. at 576 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)).
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Cedar Point's counterclaim for abuse of
process."" Cedar Point argued that
Sierra Club threatened to sue, or actually
sued, a number of oil and gas operators
in Galveston Bay solely to obtain money
for Sierra Club's Legal Defense Fund."
Applying Texas law, the Fifth
Circuit held that Sierra Club's actions did
not amount to an abuse of process
because (1) "intent to sue" letters are
statutorily mandated, and therefore
cannot be considered a threat; (2)
settlement of some of the suits shows
that Sierra Club was not motivated to
coerce monetary damages, and (3) several
of the consent judgments taken by Sierra
Club required the oil and gas operators
to make payments to environmental
groups other than Sierra Club, to be used
for conservation and education.2 07
F. Modification of the Injunction
The last issue the Fifth Circuit
decided was whether the District Court
was correct in modifying the terms of the
original injunction to allow Cedar Point
to discharge produced water during the
regulatory two year phase out period.
Sierra Club argued that the lower court
abused its discretion by modifying the
original injunction because the modified
injunction gave the oil and gas producers
in Galveston Bay a "carte blanche" to
discharge produced water until January
1, 1997!"
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with
Sierra Club's argument and affirmed the
modification of the injunction."" The
Fifth Circuit concluded that EPA was in
a better position to monitor the produced
water discharge, and ensure adherence
to the administrative compliance order."I
Cedar Point was ordered to take
affirmative steps to decrease its
produced water discharges, and was
ordered to completely stop discharging
produced water by January 1, 1997.212
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held the
injunction, as modified, did not deviate
from the purpose of the original
injunction.'
V. COMMENT
At its base, the question of
whether barium, benzene, zinc, chlorides,
sulfate, bicarbonate, ammonia,
naphthalene, phenolic, radium, oil and
grease should be wantonly discharged
into our nation's waterways can be
unequivocally answered in the negative.
However, society needs fuel to power the
machinery we all depend on. This need
is partially satisfied by domestic oil
production. In the competitive market
that all consumers desire, oil and gas
producers must be efficient. Therefore,
regulations imposed upon oil and gas
producers need to be predictable in their
application.
In theory, NPDES permits are
predictable in application if issued. The
main difficulty is that EPA has never
issued all the NPDES permits that are
required. Courts have had to supply
regulation piecemeal because of this
administrative default. The result is
unpredictability and inefficiency.
Unpredictability and
inefficiency stem from EPA's
administrative default. Much can be said
for the foresight of the drafters of the
Clean Water Act. The drafters saw that
the nation's waterways were becoming
choked with pollution, and they
envisioned a better way of regulating the
discharge of pollutants. The drafters saw
that technology had advanced enough
to allow regulators to establish technical
guidelines for dischargers to follow.
Most importantly, the drafters even
acknowledged that EPA may have
difficulty administering the complex
NPDES permit system. Therefore, the
drafters provided the ability and the
motivation for EPA to implement the
NPDES permit system. First, the drafters
provided a one year head start for EPA
to implement the necessary effluent
limitations.2 14 Secondly, the drafters gave
citizens the ability to sue EPA to make
EPA perform duties that were not
discretionary."'
Sadly, twenty four years after
the passage of the Clean Water Act, the
ability and the motivation have not
materialized. EPA has not formulated all
the required effluent limitations, and may
never accomplish this task. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Costle216 eviscerated the motivation to
implement the NPDES permit program by
holding that the issuance of NPDES
permits is a discretionary duty."'
The courts, understandably,
have been unwilling for the environment
to suffer because of EPA's
procrastination, and have instead
imposed the cost upon the nation's
economy. However, that judicial
decision leaves oil and gas producers in
Galveston Bay caught in a costly bind.
Either the oil and gas producers shut their
operations down and wait for EPA
approval, or they face the twenty-five
thousand dollar per day teeth of Clean
Water Act sanctions.2 '" Regardless of
which way the producers turn, they are
inevitably going to lose money.
Unpredictability and









33 U.S.C. § 1342(k)(1994).
21 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1994).
216Costle, 568 F.2d at 1369.2 71d. at 1375.
"'See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(1994).
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inefficiency stem from the Fifth Circuit's
use of false analogy. In Cedar Point
Oil, the court applies, by analogy, the
Supreme Court's analysis in General
Motors Corp. v. United States."' The
Fifth Circuit fails to recognize that in
General Motors, a state implementation
plan set limitations on General Motors
Corporation's emissions of ozone. The
only issue was whether EPA's failure to
act upon an extension of time request
prevented EPA from initiating suit. In
Cedar Point Oil, no applicable effluent
limitation had been issued. Cedar Point
had no ability to comply with something
that did not exist. Cedar Point's only
option was to shut its operations down,
which was not a viable economic
alternative.
The Fifth Circuit also uses
United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc.,22" to
support the imposition of liability against
Cedar Point. However, the Fifth Circuit
fails to realize that in Frezzo Bros., the
Third Circuit was most persuaded by the
fact that Frezzo Brothers Incorporated
never applied for an NPDES permit This
persuasive fact was not present in Cedar
Point Oil.
Unpredictability and
inefficiency stem from the Fifth Circuit's
expansion of organizational standing.
Courts are generally expected to adhere
to the principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere. This Latin phrase means
that our courts should adhere to
precedent and should not unsettle things
which are established. The Fifth Circuit's
opinion seemingly violates this directive,
resulting in an extension of standing that
is contrary to Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
In Cedar Point Oil the Fifth
Circuit granted organizational standing
to Sierra Club based on the affidavits of
three of Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter's
members.22' Out of the three affidavits
submitted, only one of the affiants,
Douglas, engaged in activity in the
vicinity of Cedar Point's discharge.2 22
However, Douglas did not assert, and the
court did not require, that Douglas' harm
resulted from Cedar Point's discharge.223
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of
the "fairly traceable" requirement runs
contrary to the test set out in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation.224 Lujan
unequivocally required a specific
geographic nexus between the actor and
the injury.' In fact, the Supreme Court
announced that "[ilt will not do to
'presume' the missing facts because
without them, the affidavits would not
establish the injury that they generally
allege."" In Cedar Point, the Fifth
Circuit does exactly what the Supreme
Court warned against. The Fifth Circuit
presumes that Douglas was injured
because of Cedar Point's discharge,
saying "it is sufficient for Sierra Club to
show that Cedar Point's discharge of
produced water contributes to the
pollution that impairs Douglas's use of
the bay. "227
The standard announced in
Cedar Point Oil has already led to
confusion in the Fifth Circuit. In Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Central
Petroleum Corp.,221 the plaintiff, an
environmental group, attempted to use
organizational standing to sue an oil
refinery which was discharging storm
water run-off into a river 29 The
plaintiff's affiants did not use the river
but they did use a lake located
downstream.'2" The Fifth Circuit held
that the affiants' injuries were not fairly
traceable to the storm water discharge."'
Even though the Fifth Circuit applied the
same Powell Duifryn factors, the court
said that just because water runs
downstream the injury was not fairly
traceable to discharges upstream.232
This version of the Fifth Circuit's "fairly
traceable" standard sounds remarkably
close to the standard set forth in
Lujan. 233
VI. CONCLUSION
As we progress into the next
century, it appears that EPA will never
issue all the effluent limitations and
NPDES permits required by the Clean
Water Act. Consequently, environmental
groups will continue to use the court
system to effectuate what EPA has not,
or possibly cannot. Down this road of
piecemeal,judicially imposed legislation
is an increased economic burden upon
oil and gas producers.
"'General Motors, 496 U.S. at 530.
2
"Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1123.
"'Cedar Point Oil, 73 F.3d at 556-58.
n2Id. at 557.
n2ld. at 558.
'*'Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888-89.
2251d.
161d. at 889.
"'Cedar Point Oil, 73 F.3d at 558.






2* Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888-89.
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